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Although the academic community has hotly debated the
merit and constitutionality of sexually violent person commit-
ment laws,' no one has addressed the impact these laws have on
juvenile sex offenders. Regardless of their constitutionality as
applied to adults,3 the appearance and administration of sexu-
ally violent predator laws with jurisdiction over juvenile delin-
quents violates several constitutional principles at both the state
and federal level.4 Because minors do not receive the protec-
tion of the Sixth Amendment,5 sexually violent predator laws for
juveniles violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Illinois, as the founder of the juvenile justice system in the
United States,7 gives a prime demonstration of how a state's
criminal, juvenile and mental health laws interact to violate the
rights of the nation's youngest offenders. Because of the Juve-
nile Court Act, minors may be charged with regular crimes but
generally face trial in Juvenile Court, rather than criminal
*J.D. candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2002.
'See e.g., 725 ILL. COmp. STAT. 207/1 - 207/99 (West 2000).
2 See, e.g., Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Pradice, 92 Nw. U. L REv. 1203,
1217-20 (1998) for a discussion of objections to notification laws. See, e.g. Eli M.
Rollman, "Mental Illness: A Sexualy Wolent Predator is Punished Turice for One Crim, 88J.
GCms. L & CRMNOLOGy 985 (1998) for a discussion of arguments against involuntary
commitment laws for sex offenders. Neither of these, however, fully discusses the
problems associated with applying these laws to juveniles.
' See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the validity of a sexually
violent person commitment law).4 See discussion infra part III.
'SeeMcKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
6 See discussion infra part IIL
7 See In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
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court." For example, a minor accused of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, a Class X felony under Illinois criminal law,9
would face this charge in Juvenile Court. Minors adjudicated
guilty of sex crimes are subject to the Sex Offender Registration
Act'0 and the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act," just
like adults convicted of similar crimes. 12 Scholars and practitio-
ners have debated the merit of these types of laws, questioning
their efficacy and constitutionality.1 3 Under the Sexually Violent
Persons Commitment Act, people found to be sexually violent
may be involuntarily committed to a secure facility for an in-
definite period of time-until deemed "cured," or no longer
sexually violent.
4
Juveniles in Illinois normally do not receive jury trials when
charged with offenses like aggravated criminal sexual assault.'5
Because of two thirty year-old cases declaring that juveniles do
not have state or federal constitutional rights to ajury trial,'6 the
Juvenile Court in Illinois will usually deny any motion for a trial
by juryY If the State later petitions for a juvenile guilty of ag-
gravated criminal sexual assault or other sex offenses to be clas-
8 See 705 ILL. Comp. STAT. 405/5-120 (West 2000).
9 See 720 IL. COMp. STAT. 5/12-14 (West 2000).
'0 See 730 ILL. CoMI'. STAT. 150/1 - 150/12 (West 2000) (This is an example of a
statute commonly referred to as Megan's Law. It requires convicted sex offenders to
register their names, pictures, addresses and DNA, for example, in various databases.
Offenders must update the state every time any of their identifying information
changes. This information then is available for public access and requires that the
communities in which the offenders live be notified that a sex offender is living in
their area).
" See 725 ILL. COmP. STAT. 207/1 - 207/99 (West 2000) (This statute allows the
state to petition for the involuntary, indefinite confinement of individuals who have
been convicted of sex offenses and who have a mental disorder that makes it prob-
able that they will re-offend. These individuals remain in custody, receiving trieat-
ment until such time that the state believes they are sufficiently cured to be released
back into society).
See id; 730 ILL CoMp. STAT. 150/1 - 150/12 (statutes cover both juvenile and
adult offenders.)
,3 See, e.g., Berliner, supra note 2, at 1217-20 for a discussion of objections to noti-
fication laws. See, e.g. Rollman, supra note 2, for a discussion of arguments against
involuntary commitment laws for sex offenders. Though this comment argues that
sexually violent predator commitment laws are unconstitutional as applied to juvenile
offenders, the general constitutionality of these laws is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.
4See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/40 (a), (b) (2).
'5 See In reFucini, 255 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. 1970). See discussion infra notes 29-33.
,6 See id.; McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
,7 SeeIn reG.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ill. 2000).
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sified as a sexually violent person, its petition would include the
fact that he had been adjudicated guilty of a sex offense or of-
fenses as a juvenile. 8 This constitutes one half of the State's
burden of proof in order to commit this young person to a se-
cured treatment facility for an indeterminate amount of time. 9
Thus, any juvenile sex offender, regardless of age, could be
incarcerated indefinitely because of just one offense, yet that
minor had no jury trial for the original offense, the offense that
led to his determination as a sexually violent person.2 2 Without
the right to a jury trial for the criminal offense, the use of aju-
venile's past adjudication as a sex offender in a sexually violent
persons commitment proceeding violates the minor's due proc-
ess and equal protection rights by allowing the state to indefi-
nitely commit him based on the bench trial adjudication of
guilt-21 States like Illinois that intend to apply their sexually vio-
lent person laws to juvenile offenders must provide a juvenile
defendant with a jury trial option for the alleged sex offense or
forfeit the state's ability to commit later the juvenile as a sexu-
ally violent person.2
Part II of this comment discusses the juvenile court and the
state and federal cases that have denied juveniles a constitu-
tional right to jury trials.2 Part II also explains how the sex of-
fender registration and sexually violent person laws operate. In
Part III, the interplay of these systems and laws is analyzed. Fi-
nally, Part IV concludes that while involuntary commitment laws
for sex offenders may be legal for adult offenders, they are un-
constitutional when applied to juvenile offenders because the
offenders lack the right to jury trials.
"' See725 ILL. Coup. STAT. 207/5 (f).
,9 See id.
2' See discussion infra part I.
21 See discussion infra part IIL
2 See id.
Though this comment argues that the denial ofjury trials for juveniles facing
charges of sex offenses is unconstitutional pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,




II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE JURY TRIAL
The trial by jury is an integral component of the American
and Anglo systems ofjustice. The jury trial is so important that
it appears at least twice within the Constitution.24 Article III of
the Constitution declares, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be byJury ... ."2 This ideal was
repeated in the Bill of Rights, underscoring its significance. "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public tri*al, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "2
The United States Supreme Court has frequently recog-
nized the necessity of the jury trial, most notably in Duncan v.
Louisiana, where the court held that the denial of ajury trial for
a crime punishable by two years imprisonment violated the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant.27 The Duncan Court detailed
a short history of the trial by jury and cited several of its own
opinions discussing the importance of the jury trial. 8  The
Court then explained why the jury trial is so fundamental to the
American system ofjustice:
The guarantees of a jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions re-
flect a profound judgment about the way law should be enforced and
justice administered. A right to ajury trial is granted to criminal defen-
dants in order to prevent oppression by the Government ....
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense
judgment of ajury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympa-
thetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond
this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitu-
tions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of offi-
" See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
' U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
27 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).




cial power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life
and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group ofjudges."
The jury trial not only helps ensure accurate fact-finding
but also protects citizens from abuses of power by prosecutors
and judges and places another system of checks and balances on
the government." Therefore, the juryo trial is a fundamental
component of American jurisprudence.'
B. THE JUVENILE COURT AND DENIAL OF AJURYTRIAL
The juvenile delinquency side of the Juvenile Court of Illi-
nois is similar to those of the other states.- It implements the
process afforded by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for treatment
of juveniles charged with crimes." The Juvenile Court Act and
both the Illinois and federal constitutions provide minor defen-
dants with many of the same protections that adult defendants
have. For example, juveniles have the right to counsel, the right
to be free from self-incrimination, and the right to face their ac-
cusers and question witnesses.
However, minor defendants do not have all of the same
rights as their adult counterparts.m Most importantly, juveniles
do not have the right to ajury trial. 7 Thirty years ago, both the
Illinois and the United States Supreme Courts declared that
there is neither state nor federal constitutional protection for
jury trials for juvenile defendants.' In In re Fucni, an Illinois
minor was accused of grand theft of an automobile with a value
greater than $150:39 He challenged his lack of ajury trial pursu-
ant to the Sixth Amendment and the procedural due process
grounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.0 However, the Illinois
Supreme Court found that "trial by jury is not crucial to a system
' Id. at 156.
S1 See id.
12 See id.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
See705 ILL Co p. STAT. 405/5-101 -405/5-170 (West 2000)
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971) ("Some of the constitu-
tional requirements attendant upon the state criminal trial have equal application to
that part of the state juvenile proceeding that is adjudicative in nature.").
" s See id.
37 See id.
See id. at 545; In reFucini, 255 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Il. 1970).
59 See In re Fucini, 255 N.E.2d at 380.
41 See id. at 381-82.
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ofjuvenile justice.',4 The Fucini Court did not want to add more
formality than was already present in juvenile court proceed-
ings.42
One year after Fucini, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided a similar case comprised of cases consolidated from Penn-
sylvania and North Carolina 43 and came to the same conclusion
as the Fucini Court, namely that jury trials are not fundamental• • 44
to the juvenile court process. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, mi-
nors from Pennsylvania and North Carolina appealed their
bench trial adjudications as delinquents for various criminal of-
fenses, such as robbery, non-aggravated assault, and willfully
impeding traffic. 5 The Court conceded that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments require states to provide impartial ju-
ries in all criminal prosecutions because the Court believed that
jury trials for criminal defendants are "fundamental to the
American scheme ofjustice."45 Nevertheless, the Court decided
that jury trials are not fundamental for criminal defendants un-
der the age of eighteen, despite its decision in Duncan.47
The Court recognized that the due process standard was
"fundamental fairness" 48 but found that jury trials for juveniles
did not violate this standard for several reasons. 9 First, jury tri-
als for juveniles would transform juvenile court proceedings
into fully adversarial ones. 0 Second, a federal government task
force report did not recommend such a right.' Finally, prior
Court dictum stated that jury trials are not required in every
" Id. at 382 (citation omitted).
42 See id.
45 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 535 (1971).
4" See id. at 550.
4 See id. at 534-36.
1 Id. at 540.
47 See id. at 547.
" See id. at 543.
'9 See id. at 545.
so See id.
" See id. at 546. The Court appears to have relied rather heavily on the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice, Task Force Report:
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967), treating it similar to a medical expert
in a medical malpractice case. This report did not directly make a recommendation
on the issue of jury trials for juvenile delinquents. The task force did urge that law-
makers, attorneys and judges revise the philosophy of the juvenile court system while
preserving separate treatment ofjuvenile offenders. The Court understood the lack
of a recommendation for jury trials as evidence that they were not necessary. See id.;
see also 725 ILL. Cossr. STAT. 207/40 (a), (b) (2) (West 2000).
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criminal process. 2 Therefore, the Court concluded that while
states may mandate jury trials for juvenile defendants by statute,
minors do not have the same constitutional rights as their adult
counterparts.5 Thus, "fundamental fairness" does not require
thatjuveniles' interests be protected through jury trials.5
These cases, however, are not dispositive of the issue of jury
trials for juveniles. The Supreme Court in McKeiver explicitly
stated that states may allow a statutory right to ajury trial if they
so choose.55 The Illinois Juvenile Court Act, for example, has
three exceptions to the general rule of bench trials for minor
defendants. 6 Juveniles have the right to a jury trial when they
fall under the provisions for (1) extended jurisdiction juvenile
prosecutions,57 (2) habitual juvenile offenders,0 or (3) violent
juvenile offenders.59
The extended jurisdiction provision gives jurisdiction over
the accused to both the juvenile and criminal courts.60 The ex-
tended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution provides two sen-
tences-one juvenile and one adult criminal-upon pleas,
findings or verdicts of guilt.6' The adult criminal sentence will
be stayed if the defendant successfully completes the juvenile
sentence. 62 The delinquent receives an individualized juvenile
sentence but then may serve an adult criminal sentence if he
violates the provisions of the juvenile punishment.0 This acts as
a compromise between the ideals of the juvenile court system
and the principles of the adult criminal system.r
The state can petition for juveniles to be named habitual ju-
venile offenders if they have been adjudicated delinquents three
separate times and the third offense was one of several severe




See 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-810 (West 2000); 705 ILL CO M. STAT. 405/5-815
West 2000); 705 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 405/5-820 (West 2000).
57 See 705 IL. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-810.
See 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5815.
59 See 705 ILL CoMp. STAT. 405/5820.
See 705 ILL COmp. STAT. 405/5-810(4).61 See id
6 See id.
0 See 705 ILL COMIP. STAT. 405/5-810(6), (7).
6 See 705 lu- Comp. STAT. 405/5-801 (West 2000).
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offenses.! If the state is successful, the minor will be incarcer-
ated with the Juvenile Division of the Department of Correc-
tions until his or her twenty-first birthday "without the possibilit
of parole, furlough, or non-emergency unauthorized absence."
However, these delinquents may earn credit for good conduct
that can be used to lower the time of incarceration.6
Finally, juveniles can be adjudicated violent juvenile offend-
ers if, on two separate occasions, they have been adjudicated de-
linquent for felonies "involving the use or threat of physical
force or violence against an individual or... for which an ele-
ment of the offense is possession or use of a firearm... ."o Vio-
lent juvenile offenders, like habitual juvenile offenders, face the
same period of confinement and have the opportunity to gain
good conduct credit to reduce their actual time of incarcera-
tion.0
These three provisions of the Juvenile Court Act demon-
strate that sometimes even juvenile defendants need jury trials
in order to protect their interests.7" However, juveniles receive
this protection because the purpose of the state's prosecution in
these three instances changes from rehabilitating young people
to protecting society from criminals. 71 However, these provi-
sions give rise to a statutory right to a jury trial, not a constitu-
tional one,7' and the legislature can change or remove the rightat any time.
"See 705 ILL. ComP. STAT. 405/5-815 (a) (West 2000) (The third offense must be
the "commission of or attempted commission of the following offenses: first degree
murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter; criminal sexual assault
or aggravated criminal sexual assault; aggravated or heinous battery involving perma-
nent disability or disfigurement or great bodily harm to the victim; burglary of a
home or other residence intended for use as a temporary or permanent dwelling
place for human beings; home invasion; robbery or armed robbery; or aggravated ar-
son.").
66 705 ILL. COMs. STAT. 405/5-815 (f).
67 See id.
'705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-820 (a) (West 2000).
'9 See 705 IL. CoUP. STAT. 405/5-820 (f).
70 See 705 ILL- CoMp. STAT. 405/5-801 (West 2000).
71 Compare 705 ILL. ComP. STAT. 405/5-801 ([I]n all proceedings under Sections 5-
805, 5-810 and 5-815, the community's right to be protected shall be the most impor-
tant purpose of the proceedings."), with 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (West 2000)
(purpose includes provisions allowing for the individual treatment and rehabilitation
of each minor).
' See id.
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C. INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS
The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides that a minor guilty
of a sex offense may be subject to indeterminate incarceration
with the Department of Corrections until he or she turns
twenty-one years of age, at which point the sentence automati-
cally terminates.73 Thus, a child guilty of a sex offense may be
incarcerated for several years.74 However, such a child's pun-
ishment would not end there because, as a convicted sex of-
fender, even though a juvenile offender, a minor is subject to
the Sex Offender Registration Act.75 Under the Act, an offender
faces the same constraints as an adult offender. For example,
the child is required to register as a sex offender," remain regis-
tered for ten years,m and verify his or her whereabouts four
times per year for the rest of his or her life.'
Not only are these minors subject to juvenile criminal
prosecution and the Sex Offender Registration Act but they also
fall under the jurisdiction of the Illinois Sexually Violent Per-
sons Commitment Act.80 The Act allows either the State's At-
torney or the Attorney General to petition for them to be civilly
committed to a secure treatment facility as sexually violent peo-
ple."' Under the Act, the State's Attorney or Attorney General
simply must allege that an offender "has been found delinquent
for a sexually violent offense" and that he or she "suffers from a
mental disorder that makes it substantially grobable that the
person will engage in acts of sexual violence." The Act defines
"mental disorder" as "a congenital or acquired condition affect-
ing the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a per-
7 See 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-750 (West 2000).
7' See id. Because the Juvenile Court Act covers only minors, defendants will be in-
carcerated for a minimum of three years, from age 18 to age 21. See id.; 705 ILL
COMP. STAT. 405/5-120 (West 2000).
7 See 730 ILL CoMP. STAT. 150/1 - 150/12 (West 2000).
76 See730 ILL CoP. STAT. 150/2 (A-5).
See 730 ILL ComP. STAT. 150/3.
See 730 11.- CoMP. STAT. 150/7.
7See 730 ILL CohP. STAT. 150/5-10.
See 725 IL. Coa. STAT. 207/1 - 207/99 (West 2000).
,See725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 207/15 (a).
,725 ILT CoI. STAT. 207/5 (0. The other two categories of people subject to
this Act are those who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and those
who have been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity. See
2001] 1135
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son to engage in acts of sexual violence." 3 The petition must be
filed no more than ninety days before a delinquent's release
from the Juvenile Division of the Department of Corrections. 4
An offender subject to such a petition retains all of the
rights of criminal defendants." For example, he or she has the
right to counsel, to remain silent, and to present and cross-
examine witnesses.8 However, unlike in the Juvenile Court, he
or she also has the right to request a jury trial to determine the
State's petition.8 7
During the bench or jury trial for the petition, the State
must prove its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt." If the
trier of fact finds that the juvenile is a sexually violent person,
he or she will be committed to a secure treatment facility until
such time that the State believes that the juvenile or adult for-
merjuvenile offender is no longer a threat to society. 9 Thus, if
a judge or jury grants the State's petition, a child could be in-
carcerated for ten, twenty, even fifty years or more."
The Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act generally in In re Detention of
Samuelson." The Samuelson Court followed the United States
Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks, which
sustained the constitutionality of a similar Kansas law.9 The Il-
linois Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme
Court when it declared that the Sexually Violent Persons Com-
mitment Act is civil, not criminal, in nature, despite the ele-
ments it shares with criminal laws and proceedings." Both
Courts found that these types of laws do not violate the princi-
ples prohibiting double jeopardy and ex post facto actions.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5 (b).
'4 See 725 ILL. Comp,. STAT. 207/15 (b-5) (2) (A) (West 2000).
8' See 725 ILL Comp. STAT. 207/25 (c) (West 2000).
" See id
17 See 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 207/35 (c) (West 2000).
See725 ILL CoMP. STAT. 207/35 (d) (1).
9 See 725 ILL C MP. STAT. 207/40 (a), (b) (2) (West 2000).
" See id (no limit on the duration of commitment except the determination that
the offender is no longer a sexually violent person)
9'727 N.E.2d 228 (II. 2000).
See id. at 234; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
See Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d at 235.
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-71; Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d at 234-35 ("The points




The Illinois Supreme Court also stated that, "as with the Kansas
statute, the law has no retroactive effect. A defendant cannot be
involuntarily committed based on past conduct."7
Although no record exists of any Illinois appellate cases in-
volving a juvenile protesting the propriety of involuntary com-
mitment as a sex offender, Wisconsin and Minnesota have
applied similar laws to young offenders.98 For example, in In re
Commitment of Matthew A.B., the State petitioned to commit a six-
teen year-old under Wisconsin's sexually violent persons law.97
Matthew previously had a few non-sexual delinquency determi-
nations and one adjudication for second-degree sexual assault
of a child.9 However, the acts leading to the sexual assault de-
termination ajpparently were consensual between Matthew and
another boy. At this point, the staff of Matthew's residential
care facility considered petitioning for his commitment as a
sexually violent person but decided against it.'O) After convic-
tion for a non-sexual crime and engaging in two acts of consen-
sual sexual contact with another boy that did not lead to
adjudication or conviction, Matthew faced involuntary, com-
mitment for an indefinite period of time.' ' Matthew appealed
the finding that he was sexually violent on both procedural and
substantive grounds.0 2 Matthew contended that Wisconsin's
sexually violent persons act was unconstitutional, but he did so
on the grounds that the mental disorder he was found to have
was too vague and that prediction ofjuvenile dangerousness was
too uncertain. 3 The Wisconsin court found that Matthew suf-
fered from a "conduct disorder," which was sufficient to satisfy
due process and to allow courts to predict future dangerousness
ofjuveniles1 °
9' Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d at 235.
See In re Commitment of Matthew AB., 605 NAV.2d 598 (Wis. C. App. 1999); In
re Commitment of Mervel LE., Nos. 98-0837, 97-2508, 1998 WL 665852 (WIs. C. App.
Sept. 29, 1998); In re Kubec, No. C9-97-1673, 1998 WL 27295 (Minn. CL App.Jan. 27,
1998).





"2 See id. at 603.




Wisconsin applied its commitment law to another juvenile
offender as well in In re Commitment of Mervel L.E.0 'Uuvenile
cases are private - not supposed to use last names] The state pe-
titioned for Mervel to be named sexually violent shortly before
his release from a residential facility and after he turned eight-
een.' ° Mervel had twice been adjudicated delinquent for sexual
assault. 7 He appealed the decision that he was sexually violent
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his attorney
did not raise several objections to the applicability of the law to
the defendant.0 8 Despite evidence describing the lack of ability
to predict a juvenile's likelihood to recidivate based on studies
of adults, the court denied Mervel's petition because his claims
were grounded in the ineffective assistance argument, which
carries a high burden of proof.'09 The problem of proving inef-
fective assistance also served to defeat Mervel's other arguments
because he confused procedural issues with constitutional ques-
tions."0 Relevant to the mental disorder prong, the court ex-
plained that the psychologists based their diagnoses on Mervel's
history of sex offenses as well as his "impulsiveness, minimiza-
tion and continued rationalizing of his offenses.""' The state's
psychologists believed that these few signs indicated that Mervel
had an antisocial personality disorder which predisposed him to
further commit sexually violent acts.
The one known Minnesota case applying its sexual psycho-
pathic personality law and its sexually dangerous person law to a
juvenile offender also largely dealt with the mental health is-
'10 See In re Commitment of Mervel L.E., Nos. 98-0837, 97-2508, 1998 WL 665852
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1998). This opinion is unreported and has no precedential
value.
- See id. at *1.
107 See id
"0 See id Mervel claimed his attorney was ineffective because he did not (1) argue
that the statue was unconstitutional when based on adjudications as delinquents; (2)
fully explore and develop an expert witness's evidence; (3) argue that antisocial per-
sonality disorder is not sufficiently precise to satisfy the statute; (4) challenge the
term "substantially probable" as impermissibly vague; (5) argue that the Act violates
the ex post facto clauses of the Wisconsin and federal Constitutions; and (6) chal-
lenge the Act as unconstitutional for violating equal protection. See id.
109 See id at *4.
" See id at *3-7.




sue. 13 In In re Kubec, [See BB R-10.2.1 (b) requiring the abbre-
viation of phrases like "in the matter of" to "in re"]a proba-
tion/parole officer filed a petition against a sex offender less
than two months before his nineteenth birthday alleging that he
was a sexual psychopath and a sexually dangerous person."'
The court upheld the involuntary commitment of this individ-
ual despite its reserves about the testimony of one of the expert
examiners.1 5 Though the examiner was unsure if the defendant
lacked control over his impulses, Minnesota's mental health re-
quirement for a sexual psychopathic personality, the court
found that the other expert provided clear and convincing evi-
dence." 6 Thus, even when there is conflicting expert testimony,
juveniles may be committed indefinitely.17
An Illinois appellate court recently discussed the mental
health prong of the State's allegations that a defendant was a
sexually violent person."8 In In re Detention of Walker, the court
explained that the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
"does not define the term 'substantially probable'" when it
states that the second allegation must be that the defendant "is
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder
that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage
in acts of sexual violence." 9 To determine this "substantial
probability," the court refused to base its judgment on statistical
predictions of recidivism.' 20 Instead, the court relied on the tes-
timony of two psychologists associated with the Department of
Corrections who identified various risk factors applicable to the
defendant. 2 ' Though the court recognized that the more risk
factors that apply, the greater the likelihood of recidivism, the
court did not state if a certain number or type of risk factors are
needed to be "substantially probable."'2 Since the defendant
"s See In re Kubec, No. C9-97-1673, 1998 WL 27295 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1998).
This case is unreported and has no precedential value.
'"See id. at *1.
"' See id. at *2.
116 See id.
1 See id.
18 Seeln re Detention of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
"'Id. at 1001.





appealed based on a manifest weight of the evidence argument,
the court had no need to explicitly define the term.'
Current law denies juveniles a constitutional right to a jury
trial although some states, such as Illinois, afford jury trial pro-
tection in very limited circumstances.'2 4 However, juvenile sex
offenders do not fall within these exceptions despite their vul-
nerability to petitions as sexually violent people.' Commitment
as a sexually violent person involves involuntary commitment
for an indefinite period of time in a locked treatment facility.1
26
The State bases this commitment on a defendant's prior history
of a sex offense as well as a mental disorder imprecisely defined
as making the defendant "substantially probable" to recidivate1 27
Because of the interplay of these two shaky systems, juvenile sex
offenders have a constitutional right to ajury trial.
III. ANALYSIS
Denying juvenile sex offenders a jury at the trial for their
initial alleged crimes violates these minors' constitutional
rights,128 despite the protections provided in the Sexually Vio-
lent Persons Commitment Act and other similar laws.29 Un-
doubtedly, sex offenders are often violent, dangerous people.
Commitment laws may serve to protect the community and re-
habilitate the offenders when they are adults.' The system
breaks down, however, when these commitment laws are ap-
plied to juvenile delinquents because they do not receive jury
trials for the crimes themselves to protect their interests, despite
the potential for long periods of confinement.13' State petitions
for these juveniles to be adjudicated sexually violent individuals
violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
32
12 See id. at 1001-02.
124 See discussion infra part I(B).
"'See 705 ILL. COM. STAT. 405/5-810 (West 2000); 705 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 405/5-815
(West 2000); 705 IL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-820 (West 2000); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
207/15 (a) (West 2000).
'2 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/15 (a), (b) (2).
127 See discussion infra part II (C)
'2 See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
' See, e.g. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/25 (c) (West 2000); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
207/35 (c) (West 2000); 725 ILL. Comsp. STAT. 207/35 (d) (1) (West 2000).
'0 See 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 207/40 - 207/50 (West 2000).
' See discussion infra part II(B).
112 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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A. VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Fourteenth Amendment states that, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due pro-
cess of law ... .""' The United States Supreme Court discussed
the importance of this clause in one of the preeminent juvenile
court cases, In re Gault.1 In this case, the state incarcerated a
fifteen year-old boy in a residential facility after a proceeding
pursuant to Arizona's Juvenile Code.' However, the state gave
no formal notice to the boy or his family of the proceeding, did
not swear any witnesses, and made no formal record or tran-
script of the proceeding.'
First, the Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment definitely applied to juvenile
court proceedings. The Court then addressed Arizona's con-
tention that the lack of formality was constitutional because of
the goals of the juvenile court system.' s "Departures from es-
tablished principles of due process have frequently resulted not
in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. "' Furthermore,
"the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not
ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon
or dplace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile proc-
ess." The Court went on to find that the State had wholly vio-
lated the defendant's due process rights by according him such
little protection from incarceration.
Several years later, the United States Supreme Court in
McKeiver stated that the appropriate due process standard is one
of "fundamental fairness." 4 The Court found that juvenile ad-
judications without a jury trial were fundamentally fair, partly
out of the desire to maintain juvenile adjudications as separate
13 1d&
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'S idi at 4.
.. See id. at 5.
'7 See id. at 13.
's See id. at 18-19.
1S9 I'L
.Id. at 21.
... See id. at 30-31.
' SeeMcKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
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proceedings from criminal trials.' Despite this idealistic hope,
a juvenile conviction satisfies the first of two necessary elements
for the State to commit indefinitely a defendant as a sexually
violent person."' Thus, the Sexually Violent Persons Commit-
ment Act treats juvenile adjudications for sex offenses as crimi-
nal convictions.
Two dissenting opinions have found substantial problems
with the current case law's logic. First, Justice Douglas' dissent
in McKeiver recognized that the incarceration sentences the ap-
pellants faced were at least as severe as those adults would face
in the same circumstances. 4 5 Justice Douglas also attacked the
majority's emphasis on the practical problems of implementing
jury trials in juvenile proceedings without recognizing the prac-
tical effects the lack of jury trials have on the juvenile defen-
dants. 16 He explained that rehabilitation may be less successful
when youthful offenders believe that they have been denied
their constitutional rights.147 Finally, Justice Douglas noted that
jury trials would help protect child defendants from prejudg-
ments made by the judges presiding over their cases and review-
ing the pretrial reports provided by the police and
S 141
caseworkers.
While Justice Douglas argued against the general denial of
jury trials for juveniles, Justice Heiple on the Illinois Supreme
Court attacked not only the civil status of the Sexually Violent
Persons Commitment Act, but also the validity of the mental
health prong of the Act. 49 Justice Heiple argued that "a finding
of a mental disorder flows almost inexorably from a conviction
for a violent sex offense." 50 He noted that "the State's expert...
"3 See id. at 550.
'" See id. at 543-44 ("We must recognize.. .that the fond and idealistic hopes of the
juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not
been realized."); 725 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 207/5 (f) (West 2000).
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 560 (Douglas,J, dissenting).
See id. at 561-62. ("Traumatic experiences of denial of basic rights only accentu-
ate the past deprivation and contribute to the problem. Thus, a general societal atti-
tude of acceptance of the juvenile as a person entitled to the same protection as an
adult may be the true beginning of the rehabilitative process.") Id. at 562 (citation
omitted).
17 See id.
'8 See id. at 563 (citation omitted).
'"See In re Detention of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 238-39 (Il1. 2000) (Heiple, J.
dissenting).
" Id. at 239.
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was able to diagnose defendant as having a 'mental disorder'
within the meaning of the Act solely by virtue of defendant's having
committed the acts which led to his criminal conviction and punish-
ment."151 A mental health specialist such as a psychologist or psy-
chiatrist can use the defendant's sex crimes as direct evidence
that he has a mental disorder. 52 Thus, the State could prove
beyond a reasonable doubt both of its burdens under the Sexu-
ally Violent Persons Act merely by proving that the defendant
had been convicted of committing a sex offense.'o A defendant
has a mental disorder because he has committed a sex offense
and because he has committed a sex offense and therefore has a
mental disorder, the defendant must be committed indefi-
nitely.15
The arguments of Justices Douglas and Heiple are even
more persuasive when considered in the specific context of ju-
venile sex offenders. It is fundamentally unfair to adjudicate a
juvenile guilty of a sex offense with the knowledge that the con-
viction can be the predicate for an indeterminate period of con-
finement after serving several years of incarceration in ajuvenile,
or possibly adult, prison.
Essentially, the determination of one judge could lead to
the indefinite incarceration of a child or adult who was a former
juvenile offender.'55 A juvenile fn-st faces trial for a slex offense
without the protections of ajury, allowing possibly biased, or at
least unsympathetic, judges to determine the juvenile's guilt. 7
Once the State decides to petition for indefinite commitment as
a sexually violent predator, it proves the first element of its peti-
tion, the fact that the juvenile was guilty of a sex offense, with no
contest because that original adjudication would act as the trig-
ger to the incarceration procedure.'5s The only thing a State's
expert needs in order to prove a mental disorder is to show that
151 Id.
112 See id. (State's expert explained that she diagnosed defendant as a pedophile
because he engaged in sexual activities with children despite the consequences and




"s See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1 - 207/99 (West 2000).
" See id.; discussion of denial of ajury trial infra part 1(B).
1 See discussion of the importance ofjury trials infra Part 11.
' See 725 ILL ComP. STAT. 207/5 (f).
2001] 1143
ALISON G. TUROFF
the juvenile conunitted the triggering sex offenses.'" Further-
more, an expert and the State can prove this without a concrete
definition of what is needed to show that it is a "substantial
probability" that the child will re-offend. ' As a result, what at
first blush appears to be a burden of the very highest standard
of proof in an adversarial hearing becomes a virtual guarantee
of commitment.' 6' Thus, the initial finding of guilt and the later
proof of a mental disorder essentially rests on the judgment of
one person, the potentially very fallible juvenile court judge.'62
Taken together, this violates the "fundamental fairness" stan-
dard of due process and deprives juveniles of the right to ajury
trial.
B. VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution also man-
dates that a State may not "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."' The denial of a jury
trial to juvenile sex offenders violates equal protection with re-
spect to both other juvenile delinquents and to adult sex of-
fenders.
As the Samuelson Court described, courts use the legislative
classification of the two relevant groups of people to determine
which level of scrutiny is applicable in equal protection analy-
sis.16 Racial, national origin or fundamental rights classifica-
tions trigger strict scrutiny. Courts use intermediate scrutiny
for classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.'6 For all other
cases, the court uses the rational basis test.'67 Because no court
has determined that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental
right for children, the appropriate standard is the rational basis
test.' 68 Even with this low level of scrutiny, the State lacks the
's' See discussion ofJustice Heiple's dissent in Samuelson infra Part H (C).
See discussion of Walker infra Part II(C).
' See discussion of invalidity of mental health prong infra Part II(C).
162 See discussion of denial of ajury trialinfra Part II(B).
"3 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, §1.
'6' See In re Detention of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 236 (111. 2000).
165 See id. (citing McLean v. Department of Revenue, 704 N.E.2d 352 (111. 1998)).
'66 See id. at 236.
167 See id.(citing Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (111.
1996)).
'6 Seeln re G.O., 710 N.E.2d 140, 145-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
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requisite rational basis for denying juvenile sex offenders their
right to jury trials.
1. Juvenile sex offenders versus certain other juvenile delinquents
The lMlinois Juvenile Court Act provides for three excep-
tions to the general rule that juveniles are not entitled to jury
trials.' 9 The three classes ofjuveniles are those who are subject
to (1) extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution, (2) habitual
juvenile offender provisions, and (3) violent juvenile offender
provisions7  These juveniles receive the right to a jury trial be-
cause the court is no longer interested in the best solution for
an individual juvenile defendant, but rather for the protection
of the community at large. 7 ' This is the same goal of the sexual
offender commitment laws.In The potential for consequences
such as long prison terms or treatment as an adult for these ju-
venile defendants is very high, thus demonstrating the need for
a jury trial to better protect their liberty and other interests.1
Therefore, the State grants jury trials to those juveniles who face
prosecutions in which convictions would result in lengthy incar-
ceration and when the State's prosecutorial goal is to protect
the community rather than reform the juvenile.
Juvenile sex offenders do not differ from these three special
classifications ofjuvenile defendants. Petitions for commitment
under the Sexually Violent Persons Act have the primary intent
of protecting the community from dangerous people. This is
evident from the definition of a sexually violent person; the de-
fendant must be "dangerous because he or she suffers from a
"0 See 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-810 ('West 2000); 705 IL. COMp. STAT. 405/5815
(West 2000); 705 ILL. COiMp. STAT. 405/5-820 (West 2000). See discussion of excep-
tions infraPart H(B).
'n' See 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-810; 705 ILL. COMip. STAT. 405/5-815; 705 Ia.
COMp. STAT. 405/5-820. See discussion of exceptions infra Part II(B).
'71 See 705 ILL. CoMp. SrAT. 405/5-815 (a). The third offense must be the "commis-
sion of or attempted commission of the following offenses: first degree murder, sec-
ond degree murder or involuntary manslaughter;, criminal sexual assault or
aggravated criminal sexual assault; aggravated or heinous battery involving perma-
nent disability or disfigurement or great bodily harm to the victim; burglary of a
home or other residence intended for use as a temporary or permanent dwelling
place for human beings; home invasion; robbery or armed robbery, or aggravated ar-
son." Id.
172 Compare 705 ILa, Cow. STAT. 405/5-101(West 2000), withi 725 ILL. COiP. STAT.
207/40(a), (b) (5) (West 2000)..
See 725 11-. COP. STAT. 207/40 (a), (b)(2) (no limit on length of incarceration
except the dangerousness of the offender).
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mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the
person will engage in acts of sexual violence." 74 If the State
simply wanted to help rehabilitate all of its citizens who have
committed sex offenses, it would implement treatment into
punishment for the offense. Rather, the State has the legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens by removing dangerous people
from society. Nevertheless, like the State's interest in the three
classifications of juvenile offenders, the State's interest in juve-
nile sex offender cases lies in protecting society rather than re-
habilitating the defendant as in regular juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 7 5 The State's classification of these two groups of
people, sex offenders and serious juvenile offenders subject to
the other three classifications, is purely arbitrary and violates
the equal protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.""
The State must provide jury trials for these juveniles if it wants
to continue applying the involuntary commitment law to young
people, just as it does for the other three types of juvenile of-
fenders.A
An Illinois appellate court found that a juvenile charged
with first degree murder was similarly situated to juveniles sub-
ject to the habitual and violent offender provisions of the Juve-
nile Court Act for purposes of equal protection analysis.' 78 The
court recognized that the appropriate standard was the rational
relationship test.1 7 The court rejected the state's argument that
the repeat offenders were substantially different from the juve-
nile accused of murder and noted that the juvenile accused of
murder faced more dire circumstances because he had no abil-
ity to earn good time credit, unlike the repeat offenders.'s The
court futther grounded its holding in the idea that when the
state's prosecutorial goal is the protection of society as well as
rehabilitation, the defendant requires a jury trial.'8 ' Thus, the
court determined that the state's denial of a jury trial violated
,'7 725 ILL. Gomp. STAT. 207/5 (f) (West 2000).
175 Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (West 2000), with 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
207/40(a), (b) (5) (West 2000).
'76 See In re G.O., 710 N.E.2d 140, 146 (IM. App. Ct. 1999) (discussing the improper
treatment ofjuvenile murder defendants versusjuvenile repeat offenders).
1 See id.
178 See id.





equal protection, even though it used the low standard of ra-
tional relationship.'8 There was no rational relationship or le-
gitimate state goal in treating one member (juvenile murder
defendants) of a class differentlyfrom other members (habitual
and violentjuvenile offenders).'
The Illinois Supreme Court later overturned In re G.O. be-
cause the court invalidated the law mandating the juvenile
murder defendant's incarceration because the statute in which
it was passed violated the single subject rule.'m The appellate
court's reasoning still stands, however. The Illinois Supreme
Court refused to rule on the merits of the reasoning because it
would equate to an advisory opinion.'a However, the appellate
court's reasoning is sound and the Supreme Court made no at-
tempt to discredit it.1 6
Juvenile sex offenders, like the murder defendants, are the
same as the other three categories of delinquents in terms of
the degree of punishment and loss of liberty. Delinquents
prosecuted under extended jurisdiction face two sentences, one
juvenile and one criminal.' If the child violates the provisions
of his or her juvenile sentence in any way, he or she will have to
serve the adult criminal sentence as well.' This is akin to the
child sex offender who not only faces his or her juvenile sen-
tence for the offense but also the possible future commitment
as a sexually violent person at the end of the juvenile sentence.
The juvenile sex offender's fate is at least as severe as the second
sentence an extended jurisdiction juvenile faces since the invol-
untary commitment as a sex offender is indeterminate.9
Moreover, the sex offending juvenile could lose his or her lib-
erty for a much longer period of time than the juvenile facing
an adult criminal sentence.9 0
Juvenile sex offenders are likewise similarly situated to ha-
bitual and violent juvenile offenders. Habitual and violent ju-
venile offenders could be sentenced to juvenile prison until
"' See id. at 146-47.
'' See id. at 146.
See In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ill. 2000).
' See id. at 1008.
z See id. at 1007-08 (no ruling on the merits of the appellate court's arguments.)
0 See 705 IL. CoM. STAT. 405/5-810(4) (West 2000).
'8' See id.
"See 725 ILL Comp. STAT. 207/40 (a) (West 2000).
Compare, e.g., id., with 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5820 (0 (West 2000).
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their twenty-first birthdays because of their likelihood to re-
offend and put society in danger.91 ' This is the same principle
used in Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act hearings.'
To protect society from people likely to commit more sex of-
fenses, the State can petition to incarcerate further dangerous
sex offenders.9 3 This petition is triggered by the conviction for
an original offense, just as the State's ability to petition to pro-
ceed under Habitual or Violent Juvenile Offender provision
stems from an original offense and the likelihood that the de-
linquent will recidivate
9 4
The consequences juvenile sex offenders face are at least as
serious as, if not more so than, those faced by habitual or violent
juvenile offenders. Juvenile sex offenders do not receive good
conduct credit when they are incarcerated until their twenty-
first birthdays, unlike the habitual or violent offenders." 5 In ad-
dition, habitual and violent juvenile offenders do not face
commitment proceedings after their juvenile detentions, unlike
juvenile sex offenders.19 Thus, the consequences are more dire
for juvenile sex offenders than for habitual or violent offenders,
yet they do not receive jury trials to protect their liberty inter-
ests.
97
There is no rational relationship for giving juvenile sex of-
fenders less protection than their delinquent counterparts who
have not committed sex offenses.' 8 If anything, juvenile sex of-
fenders should receive more procedural protection because
they have the potential to spend many more years incarcerated
than the other delinquents. The juvenile offenders possessing
the right to a jury trial have this safeguard in order to ensure
that they do not suffer serious consequences without the appro-
"' See 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-815 (f) (West 2000); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-
820 (f) (West 2000).
,92 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/15(b) (5) (West 2000) (offender alleged dangerous
because he is likely to re-offend).
193 See id.
See 705 ILL COm'. STAT. 405/5-815 (a); 705 ILL. Comp. STAT. 405/5-820 (a).
"' See 705 ILL Comp. STAT. 405/5-750, 5-755 (West 2000) (no provision for good
conduct credit for minors incarcerated until they reach the age of 21).
'9 See 705 ILL Com. STAT. 405/5-805 (West 2000); 705 IL. COMp. STAT. 405/5-8 10
(West 2000); 705 ILL Com. STAT. 405/5-815 (no provision for further commitment
once a delinquent serves a full sentence).
117 See id. (no provision forjuvenile sex offenders).
'" See In re G.O., 710 N.E.2d 140, 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
'99 See id.
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priate due process.' Nevertheless, juvenile sex offenders do
not have this protection, despite their potential punishments.
Juvenile sex offenders are similarly situated to their juvenile of-
fender cohorts, but the State does not provide them with equal
protection. There is no rational relationship between lower
procedural protection for sex offenders and higher protection
for non-sexual, violent and habitual offenders.
2. Juvenile sex offenders versus adult sex offenders
Juvenile sex offenders are denied the equal protection of
the laws in another way as well. Juvenile sex offenders face the
same potential for confinement as do adult sex offenders, but
juvenile sex offenders do not receive the same right to a jury
trial as their adult counterparts.2 Once again, there is no ra-
tional relationship between the State's denial of a jury trial to
juveniles and a legitimate state interest since the State's goal is
the same in both juvenile and adult sex offender cases. "
Once ajuvenile has been adjudicated guilty of a sex offense,
he or she faces the same consequences as an adult sex of-
fender.2 13 First, juvenile sex offenders must register as such
through the Sex Offender Registration Act-2  As stated earlier,
there are no special provisions for juveniles registered through
the actY05 They must follow all of the same rules as adult sex of-
fenders, such as remaining registered for ten years and giving
notice of their whereabouts four times annually. 7
Juvenile sex offenders also face the exact consequences as
adult sex offenders when petitioned to be named sexually vio-
lent people.m Juvenile delinquency is a basis for commencing
such a petition, but there are no provisions separating juvenile
offenders from adults in terms of rights and consequences.
However, of the three classifications of people subject to the
See 705 IL COmp. STAT. 405/5-801 (West 2000).
2" See 725 ILL. COmp. STAT. 207/5 (f) (West 2000).2 See 725 IkT. Comp. STAT. 207/1.
See 725 ILL. Co P. STAT. 207/5 (f).
See 730 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 150/1 -150/12 (West 2000).
See 730 ILL. Co P. STAT. 150/2 (A-5).
2 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/7.
2n See 730 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 150/5-10.




commitment act,21° only one of the three, the juvenile delin-
quent, does not have the right to have his or her case decided
by a jury at the trial for the original offense. In all other re-
spects, the juvenile delinquent is treated the same as his or her
adult counterparts.2
There can be no rational relationship for holding juveniles
to the same consequences as adults without providing the same
fundamental protections as adults. Justice Douglas argued,
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, which makes trial by jury pro-
vided in the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States, speaks
of denial of rights to 'any person,' not denial of rights to 'any
adult person ... '" Forjuvenile sex offenders, the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment is just that, protection against
the denial of rights to "any adult person. '1 4 Yet, there is no ra-
tional relationship for treating the two types of offenders differ-
ently in the specific context of sex offenders.
A Wisconsin Supreme Court justice argued this very point
when three juveniles appealed for the right to ajury in their tri-
als for various offenses:
The majority fails to identify a rational basis on which to rest its distinc-
tion between adults who become subject to [Wisconsin's sex offender
commitment law's] confinement proceedings after ajury trial and juve-
niles who become subject to [the commitment law] without the protec-
tions of a jury trial, because there is no such basis.... The majority's
response, that in order for a child adjudged delinquent to be committed
under [the commitment law] that child must also be dangerous due to a
mental disorder, serves only as a smoke and mirrors attempt to avoid the
real issue. Adult convicts, those committed [because they were not guilty
by reason of insanity], and juveniles adjudged delinquent all must be
dangerous due to a mental disorder and likely to commit sexual vio-
lence. Yet, of these three classes of individuals, it is only the juvenile ad-
judged delinquent that becomes subject to a [commitment] petition
without the benefit of ajury trial"2
6
210 Convicted sex offenders, adjudicated juvenile sex offenders and offenders not
criminally liable of a sex offense because of insanity. See id.
" 1 See discussion of denial ofjury trial infra Part I(B).
212 See 725 ILL CoMP. STAT. 207/5 (f) (West 2000).
213 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 560 (1971) (Douglas,J. dissenting).
214 See id.
" See In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 687 (Wis. 1998) (BradleyJ. dissenting).
16Id.
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Both juvenile and adult sex offenders are subject to com-
mitment laws like the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
yet only juveniles become exposed to commitment without jury
trials. 2' The State's distinction is completely arbitrary for the
State can have no legitimate interest in providing protection to
adults while leaving children vulnerable. B
Juveniles generally are treated differently than their adult
counterparts.2 However, in the context of sex offending juve-
niles, there is no difference between the two groups other than
the protections provided to them. " There is no rational basis,
therefore, for providing juveniles with less protection against in-
justice than that which adults receive in sex offender cases."
Denial of jury trials to juvenile sex offenders violates their con-
stitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws
and must be remedied by allowing them the right to a jury in
the trial for the original sex offense. Otherwise, the State must
forfeit its ability to petition for the involuntary commitment of
juvenile offenders as sexually violent people.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sex offenders can be dangerous and it is understandable
that society wants to protect the public. The goal of rehabilita-
tion is an admirable one, but the means, indeterminate incar-
ceration, are beyond the limits of the Constitution when applied
to juvenile sex offenders. Juvenile offenders need the protec-
tion of ajury trial when charged with violent sexual offenses be-
cause of the severe consequences they face.2 Denying these
young people the right to a jur y trial when they could poten-
tially be committed indefinitely "o violates both their rights to
due process and equal protection of the laws. Rather than forc-
ing children to act older than their age by treating them as
adults when they commit sex offenses, the courts and society at
large need to re-embrace the original purpose and goals of the
217 See a
218 See id.
"' See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
"'See In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d at 687.
"' See id.
2 See 725 ILL Comp. STAT. 207/40 (a), (b) (2) (West 2000).
' See id.
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Juvenile Court and help rehabilitate juveniles instead of locking
them up and throwing away the key.
